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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In the last term, the Tenth Circuit decided several cases
which were primarily concerned with questions of administrative
law. Questions raised in these cases related to, among other
things, access to agency information, allowance of benefits, and
issuance of certificates and permits under statutory provisions
and agency regulations implementing these statutes. In general,
the decisions reached by the court were justified on the basis of
traditional administrative law theories. The court continued to
defer to the determinations made by administrative agencies on
questions subject to agency discretion where the court found the
evidence sufficient to support the determination, thus narrowing
the scope of judicial review. However, the court also continued to
maintain its role as final arbiter on questions of statutory inter-
pretation and other questions of law. The decisions by the court
were generally consistent with its prior decisions and also with the
decisions of other circuits.
What is perhaps most significant about the cases heard by
the court is not the final theories under which the cases were
decided, but the types of questions which are being raised under
various federal statutes before the various agencies. Although the
court's decisions covered a broad range of topics, the heaviest
concentration of cases occurred in the areas of equal employment
opportunity, social security administration, regulation of natural
gas, and access to administrative information; it is in these areas
that the court made its most significant contribution to the body
of case law in the Tenth Circuit.
I. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)l was the subject of
review in Campbell v. United States Civil Service Commission'
and Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB. 3 In both cases, the scope
of one of the exemptions from the disclosure requirements of the
FOIA4 was involved. In each case, the Tenth Circuit concluded
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
2 539 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1976).
539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976).
1 The FOIA provides that each governmental agency shall make available to the
public information specified in the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). Certain
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
that the requested materials were exempt based on principles
adopted by other circuits for determining the scope of an exemp-
tion.
In Campbell, employees of the Environmental Research Lab-
oratory in Boulder, Colorado, sought disclosure of a report con-
taining two parts and three appendices' compiled as the result of
a routine investigation of the laboratory's personnel manage-
ment. After the Civil Service Commission denied disclosure of the
entire report on the grounds that each component was protected
from disclosure by an exemption,' the employees brought an ac-
tion in the district court pursuant to the FOIA to compel disclo-
sure.7 When the district court ordered disclosure of only Part I
and Appendix III to the report the plaintiffs appealed" the deci-
sion to the Tenth Circuit. By the time the Tenth Circuit reviewed
the case, the only question for determination was whether Ap-
pendices I and II were exempt from disclosure.'
The Tenth Circuit first analyzed the question under exemp-
tion six of the FOIA, which provides an exemption from disclo-
sure for "personnel and medical files and similar files," the dis-
types of information, however, fall within one of nine exemptions from disclosure. Id. The
relevant exemptions, for this Overview, provide that disclosure requirements do not apply
to matters that are included in either (1) "personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy," or (2) "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would . . . interfere with enforcement
proceedings .... " Id. § 552(b)(6), (7)(A).
The two parts contained appraisals and evaluations of personnel. Appendix I listed
employees erroneously classified in the Service; Appendix II named employees who had
been promoted contrary to Commission regulations; and Appendix III included a statisti-
cal analysis of the responses of laboratory employees to certain questionnaires. 539 F.2d
at 60.
6 Id.
The FOIA authorizes the district court of the complainant's residence to enjoin an
agency from withholding records and to order production of records improperly withheld.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974).
539 F.2d at 60.
Following the ruling of the district court, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ruled that Civil Service Commission personnel management evaluation reports
were not exempt from disclosure. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In
Vaughn, however, the question of disclosure of appendices, similar to Appendices I and II
of the laboratory report, was not addressed; the plaintiffs in that case did not appeal a
decision of the district court exempting such appendices from disclosure. After the deci-
sion in Vaughn, the Civil Service Commission released both parts of the report as well as
Appendix III. Campbell v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 539 F.2d at 61.
VOL. 54
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
closure of which would "constitute a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy."' 0 Based upon the decisions of other
courts," the Tenth Circuit quickly concluded that both append-
ices fell within the "similar files" clause of the exemption.'"
Hence, the court was left with only one issue to determine:
whether or not disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy."
The court noted that Congress had recommended the balanc-
ing of an individual's right of privacy against the public's right
to government information.'3 The court then identified three fac-
tors which had been considered in prior cases" applying this bal-
ancing test:
1. Would disclosure result in an invasion of privacy and, if so, how
serious?
2. The extent or value of the public interest purpose or objective
of the individuals seeking disclosure.
3. Whether the information is available from other sources.'5
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1974). See note 4 supra.
Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 371-82 (1976) (case summaries
of honor code violations are "similar files" within the meaning of exemption 6); Wine
Hobby USA, Inc. v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 502 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1974)
(list of names and addresses of wine producers held to be similar files); Robles v. EPA,
484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973) (files on homes with high radiation levels discovered in EPA
study held to be similar files). It is not clear that the Robles court actually concluded that
the files in question were "similar files." While the court found the argument to that effect
persuasive, it precluded exemption from disclosure because disclosure would not have
resulted in a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.
"1 Based on Rose, the court claimed that since the appendices included "personnel
information, it cannot be effectively argued that these are not 'similar files."' 539 F.2d at
61. In addition, the court construed both Wine Hobby and Robles to give a "broader
interpretation to the term [similar files] than we are required to give here." Id.
" The legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act with respect to exemption
6 provides: "The limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' pro-
vides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of privacy and the
preservation of the public's right to Governmental information by excluding those kinds
of files the disclosure of which might harm the individual." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [19661 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2428.
The Supreme Court has concluded with respect to exemption 6 that, "Congress
sought to construct an exemption that would require a balancing of the individual's right
of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act
'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny."' Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
" See, e.g., Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73,
77 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Gettman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
11 539 F.2d at 61.
1977
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Under the FOIA and cases interpreting the Act, the burden lies
with the Government to shift the balance in favor of non-
disclosure to establish the exemption."
In Campbell, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district
court had not abused its discretion in finding the balance in favor
of non-disclosure with respect to Appendices I and II. The court
reasoned that (1) a serious potential invasion of privacy would
result if information regarding an individual's job classification
and salary were made publicly available," and that (2) the public
interest is best served by "disclosure of general agency perform-
ance rather than by specific revelation of individual problems."'"
Hence, the information contained in the Appendices was deemed
to be too specific to warrant general public availability at the
expense of individual privacy. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
exemption of the Appendices from disclosure, even though the
general policy of the FOIA favors disclosure. 9
The scope of exemption 7(A)2" of the FOIA was considered in
Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB.2 ' Pursuant to a charge of
unfair labor practices by the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers
International Union, the NLRB filed a complaint against the
company; Climax then requested that the NLRB make available
affidavits and statements obtained from company employees re-
lative to the charges made in the complaint. 2 The NLRB denied
the request based on the fact that the affidavits were investiga-
tory records compiled for law enforcement proceedings, the pro-
duction of which would interfere with the proceedings, and that
the affidavits were therefore exempt from disclosure by exemp-
tion 7(A) of the Act.3 In a suit brought by Climax to compel
' The agency seeking the exemption has the burden of establishing the exemption.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1974). See, e.g., Rural Hous. Alliance v. United States
Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Gettman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
674 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" 539 F.2d at 62.
Id.
, The exemptions from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information
Act "do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective
of the Act." Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
2 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 1974). See note 4 supra.
2 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976).




disclosure, the district court concluded that the affidavits were
exempt.2
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Climax argued that the
NLRB had failed to meet the burden necessary to establish the
exemption. Specifically, Climax denied that the NLRB had es-
tablished that "disclosure would interfere with enforcement pro-
ceedings ... ."5 The Tenth Circuit rejected Climax's argument
and adopted the contention of the NLRB: "[D]isclosure of em-
ployee statements in any unfair labor practices case would inter-
fere with enforcement proceedings." 6 The court justified its posi-
tion by reasoning that the relationship between an employer and
an employee is sensitive, and that a "labor case is peculiarly
susceptible to employer retaliation, coercion, or influence to the
point that there is no need for an express showing of interference
in each case to justify giving effect to the exemption contained
in Section 7(A) . . . ."I The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that doc-
uments obtained in NLRB enforcement proceedings are abso-
lutely protected from disclosure while the proceedings are pend-
ing is consistent with the decisions of the First and Second Cir-
cuits.28
II. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Three Tenth Circuit cases considered the retroactivity of the
1972 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 In
" Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 208 (D.C. Colo. 1975).
25 539 F.2d at 64.
I d.
27 Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
Goodfriend W. Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1976); Title Guaranty Co. v.
NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976). The court in Title Guaranty found it "unnecessary to
make the broad determination that any investigative information obtained in connection
with a pending enforcement proceeding is per se nondisclosable." 534 F.2d at 491. The
court did note, however, that disclosure of statements and affidavits of employees ob-
tained by the NLRB in connection with law enforcement proceedings could well result in
interference with the enforcement proceeding. Id. Without requiring the NLRB to estab-
lish that such interference would occur, the court held that the exemption did apply to
such information. Relying on the Title Guaranty decision, the First Circuit in Goodfriend
W. Corp. rejected the district court's conclusion that the exemption applied to employee
affidavits obtained in NLRB enforcement proceedings. Instead, the court adopted the
Title Guaranty holding that "all statements of employees obtained in connection with
unfair labor practice proceedings pending before the NLRB are exempt from disclosure
under § 552(b)(7)(A)." 535 F.2d at 146.
" Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
1977
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each of the cases,39 although the effective date of the amendment
was March 24, 1972, the court concluded that the amendment
should be given retroactive effect. In a subsequent, unrelated
case, the United States Supreme Court also gave the amendment
retroactive effect.3' With the advantage of hindsight, the Tenth
Circuit's decision on this question seems unassailable.
2
In Weahkee v. Powell,33 a former employee of the EEOC
brought an action against agency officials, alleging unlawful dis-
crimination against himself and others as American Indians.
34
Prior to this suit, both the EEOC and the United States Civil
Service Commission rendered administrative determinations
adverse to Weahkee.3 1 The district court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the theory that the complaint
did not point out any specific objections to the administrative
record. The district court did not, however, hold that the admin-
istrative decision was supported by the record. The Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that the failure "to examine the administrative
record and determine whether the administrative record contains
substantial evidence supporting agency action" was error.36
By disposing of the case in this manner, the Tenth Circuit
was able to avoid the determination of whether federal employees
are entitled to a trial de novo in district court as other Title VII
claimants are, a question on which the circuits were then split. 7
. EEOC v. Duval, 528 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 535 F.2d
1213 (10th Cir. 1976); Weahkee v. Powell, 532 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1976).
' International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers Local 790 v. Robbins &
Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1977). The issue of retroactivity had evaded review in
two Supreme Court decisions during the 1975 Term. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238 n.10 (1976); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 824 n.4 (1976).
32 At the time the Tenth Circuit decided these cases, supra note 2, there was a split
in the circuits on whether the amendment should be given retroactive effect with the
Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits favoring retroactivity. Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,
507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 820 (1976); Koger v. Ball,
497 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1974); Womack v. Lynn, 504 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Sixth
Circuit had opposed retroactivity. Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1974),
vacated, 426 U.S. 432 (1976).
33 532 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1976).
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. 11 1972).
31 The plaintiff had also presented the trial court with claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1982, and 1985 (1970), but these claims did not affect the administrative law ques-
tions. 532 F.2d at 730.
31 532 F.2d at 729. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
11 Four courts of appeals had held that federal employees had a right to a trial de novo
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The Supreme Court subsequently held, in Chandler v.
Roudebush,38 that federal employees also have a right to a trial
de novo in the district court. Under Chandler, the district court
cannot substitute a review of the administrative record in lieu of
a trial de novo.
On the contrary, the options which Congress considered were en-
tirely straightforward. It faced a choice between record review of
agency action based on traditional appellate standards and trial de
novo of Title VII claims. The Senate committee selected trial de
novo as the proper means for resolving the claims of federal employ-
ees. The Senate broadened the category of claims entitled to trial
de novo to include those of private-sector employees, and the Sen-
ate's decision to treat private-sector and federal-sector employees
alike in this respect was ratified by the Congress as a whole.
The respondents' contention that administrative dispositions of
federal employee discrimination complaints would . . . furnish an
adequate basis for "substantial evidence" review cannot overcome
the import of the statutory language and the legislative history.3
Following Chandler, the 1975 Tenth Circuit decision of Salone v.
United States,0 which held that federal employees did not have
a right to a trial de novo, was vacated.4 Therefore, in light of the
above decisions, on remand Weahkee must be given a trial de
novo by the district court, as opposed to the more limited review
of the administrative record.42
The appellant, Weahkee, also claimed that the district
court's refusal to review the administrative record was a denial
of due process. This claim was based upon the Administrative
Procedure Act.43 The Tenth Circuit, however, concluded that the
under section 717(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. 111972). Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d
1226 (6th Cir. 1976); Caro v. Schultz, 521 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
919 (1976); Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sperling v. United
States, 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976). Three courts of
appeals had held that federal employees had no right to a trial de novo. Haire v. Calloway,
526 F.2d 246 (1975), vacated, 537 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1976); Chandler v. Johnson, 515 F.2d
251 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nor., Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976); Salone
v. United States, 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 917 (1976).
' 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
Id. at 861-63 (footnote omitted).
*0 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 917 (1976). See also 53 DEN. L.J.
29 (1976).
" 426 U.S. 917 (1976).
:2 532 F.2d at 729.
'1 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 701-706 (1970).
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APA was inapplicable by reasoning that the 1972 amendment
provided the exclusive administrative procedure for federal em-
ployee discrimination charges. The same conclusion was subse-
quently reached by the Supreme Court in Brown v. General Serv-
ices Administration."
In EEOC v. Duval,45 the Tenth Circuit upheld the Commis-
sion's authority to file suits in district court during the same
ninety-day period during which the charging party can file suit.46
As a preliminary matter, the court noted that the EEOC's right
to file suit does not terminate upon the expiration of the 180-day
period following the filing of the charge and during which the
EEOC can conduct an investigation and attempt conciliation. 7
During this initial 180 days, the charging party cannot initiate a
Title VII suit.'8 This period is designed to provide the EEOC an
opportunity to investigate the charge and to attempt conciliation.
Of course, in practice, neither goal is completed within the 180-
day period because of the serious backlog in charges pending
before the Commission. 9
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion, which allows the EEOC to
file an action after the 180-day period, was not accompanied by
much helpful discussion. The court simply noted that other cir-
cuits had reached the same result. Among the considerations
" 425 U.S. 820 (1976). In his opinion for the Court in Brown, Justice Stewart stated:
[T]he congressional intent in 1972 was to create an exclusive, pre-emptive
administrative and judicial scheme for redress of federal employment dis-
crimination. We need not, however, rest our decision upon this inference
alone. For the structure of the 1972 amendment itself fully confirms the
conclusion that Congress intended it to be exclusive and pre-emptive.
Id. at 829 (emphasis supplied).
' 528 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1976).
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
11 528 F.2d at 947. Accord, EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976).
11 The charging party is not barred from initiating other available legal actions, such
as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), by the fact that he or she has filed a Title VII claim and the
fact that the charging party has filed a Title VII charge does not toll the statute of
limitations on other claims. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers
Local 790 v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
The charging party is precluded from filing a Title VII suit in district court during
this initial 180 days in order to afford the EEOC time to effect a voluntary conciliation
agreement with the employer free of the interference of a pending law suit. 528 F.2d at
948. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at 461.
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which led other circuits to reach this conclusion was the fact that
Title VII expressly limits the employee's right to file suit to a
ninety-day period while no similar express limitation is imposed
upon the EEOC.50 Moreover, at the time of the enactment of the
1972 amendment, which authorized the EEOC to file actions in
district court, Congress was aware that the EEOC was not able
to complete most of its investigations and conciliation procedures
within 180 days. With this knowledge, courts have been unwilling
to attribute to Congress an intent to limit the EEOC enforcement
powers to the initial 180 days because such a construction would
largely defeat the remedial purpose of the amendment. 51
The more difficult question confronting the Tenth Circuit
was whether the charging party had the exclusive authority to
initiate suit during the ninety-day period following receipt of the
"right-to-sue" letter. 5 In Duval, the EEOC filed a complaint be-
fore this ninety-day period had elapsed and before the charging
party had acted. The charging party subsequently sought to in-
tervene. The corporate defendant obtained a dismissal on the
ground that the charging party alone could initiate legal action
during this ninety-day period. The district court viewed the
EEOC's suit as "'duplicitous.' ",53
This issue of multiple actions was previously raised in Crump
v. Wagner Electric Corp.," a case before the Missouri federal
district court. In Crump, the charging party filed an action four-
teen days after the EEOC filed its action. The district court dis-
missed the charging party's suit without prejudice to interven-
tion, which is specifically provided for by Title VII, 55 in the
EEOC's suit. The approach taken in Crump was approved by the
Tenth Circuit in Duval and the dismissal was, therefore, re-
versed."5
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. H 1972). See EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975).
11 EEOC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 505 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 824 (1975).
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
5' 528 F.2d at 947. Accord, EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 71, 75 (8th Cir.
1974).
369 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972).
528 F.2d at 948-49.
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When confronted with a similar situation,57 the Ninth Circuit
subsequently concluded that multiple actions could be avoided
by consolidation under Rule 42(a), 8 rather than by dismissal with
leave to intervene. When simplicity and the avoidance of possible
confusion are considered, the Ninth Circuit's solution appears
preferable if both the EEOC and the charging party have actually
filed separate suits. However, where one or the other has filed
first, intervention would seem to be the preferable manner for
joining the fray by the remaining litigant since this is expressly
provided for by statute.
The principal issue decided by a divided panel in EEOC v.
Wilson & Co."9 was whether a case was "pending" before the
EEOC when the 1972 amendment to Title VII became effective.
60
In October of 1970 and January of 1971, the charging party, Ber-
nal, filed discrimination charges with the EEOC. In November of
1971, the Commission's Albuquerque office forwarded the file to
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Later Bernal requested a
"right-to-sue" letter which was given to him on January 27, 1972.
Prior to the 1972 amendment, a charging party was given
thirty days to bring his or her private action." The main issue in
Wilson involved the interpretation of a Commission regulation
which required the agency to suspend further action upon the
issuance of a "right-to-sue" letter unless the Commission deter-
mines that it is in the "public interest" to continue or the Com-
mission is requested to continue by the charging party. 2 Neither
of these two contingencies occurred in Wilson and, thereafter,
upon lapse of the thirty-day period during which the charging
party could have filed suit, but did not, the district court con-
cluded that the "suspension" was, in effect, a "termination."
This resulted in the further determination that the case was,
therefore, not "pending" before the Commission on the effective
57 EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 544 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1976).
58 "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
" 535 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir. 1976). Judge McWilliams wrote for himself and Judge
Doyle while Judge Barrett filed a vituperative dissent.
6 See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
" The trial court relied upon 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25a(d) (1971). 535 F.2d at 1215. This
regulation is no longer in force.
VOL. 54
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date of the 1972 amendment which gave the Commission the
right to sue. 3 This issue was raised by the lower court sua sponte
and, because of this, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for
further development of the record on the question of whether the
charge was pending before the Commission on March 24, 1972.
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit suggested, in rather strong lan-
guage, that, in its opinion, the charge was still pending on that
date."
Judge Barrett, as noted in his dissenting opinion, would have
affirmed the district court's holding for reasons in addition to
those advanced by the trial court. First, the charging party had
not filed his charge with the appropriate state agency before sub-
mitting his charge to the EEOC.5 Second, the Commission did
not file suit until six months after conciliation had failed and
"[tihis 'lapse' constitutes further and utter jurisdictional fail-
ure, even under the 'liberalized' 1972 amendments."" Third,
Judge Barrett concluded that the Commission had not filed suit
in conformance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) as it appeared prior
to the 1972 amendment. The panel majority, however, was unper-
suaded by his arguments.
In EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co. 7 the issue before the court
concerned the timeliness of a complainant's motion for interven-
tion in an EEOC action filed within ninety days after the com-
plainant received a "right-to-sue" letter. 8 Navajo argued that the
ninety-day period within which a complainant could bring suit or
intervene began to run when he received notice that conciliation
efforts had failed. The court held, instead, that the ninety-day
period began to run from the date of receipt of a "right-to-sue"
63 By its express terms the 1972 amendment applies to charges pending before the
Commission on the date of its enactment. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 14, 86 Stat. 103, 113. See
International Union of Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Meyers,
Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976).
" 535 F.2d at 1215-16.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1970).
535 F.2d at 1217.
,7 No. 75-1542 (10th Cir., June 16, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. 111972); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (1975). The complain-
ant filed a charge with the EEOC on August 18, 1971, and on July 25, 1973, the EEOC
informed him that conciliation efforts had failed, and that, if he desired to bring suit, he
should request a "right-to-sue" letter, which he did. On December 3, 1974, the EEOC
instituted this action, which was based, in part, upon the complainant's charge. On
December 13, 1974, the EEOC issued a "right-to-sue" letter.
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letter, and that therefore the application to intervene was
timely. 9 The Tenth Circuit was advised that the EEOC had dis-
continued the "two-letter" procedure after the controversy in this
case began, so the issue in this case is of marginal significance. 0
III. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970
In two cases the Tenth Circuit reviewed and upheld adminis-
trative orders issued pursuant to the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970.71 Both the legal construction accorded certain
safety regulations and the constitutionality of those regulations
were reviewed in Clarkson Construction Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission.7" Clarkson Construction
Company sought review of a Commission order73 affirming the
citation and civil penalty imposed against Clarkson as a result of
its violation of a certain safety regulation. The applicable safety
regulation required that trucks on certain worksites be equipped
with an audible backup warning signal or, in the alternative, that
trucks without such a device be permitted to back up only after
the driver received assurance from a lookout that it was safe to
do so." In this case, a truck, owned by one of Clarkson's subcon-
" For cases upholding the two-letter procedure and further holding that the 90-day
period begins to run from the date of receipt of the "right-to-sue" letter, see Williams v.
Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976), and Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
71 No. 75-1542 at 6.
7, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
72 531 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1976).
13 [1974-1975] OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEAITH DEC. (CCH) 19,071.
74 29 C.F.R. § 1926.601(b)(4) (1976). This section reads: "No employer shall use any
motor vehicle equipment having an obstructed view to the rear unless: (i) The vehicle
has a reverse signal alarm audible above the surrounding noise level or: (ii) The vehicle
is backed up only when an observer signals that it is safe to do so." Covered employers
must comply with these regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970). These regulations are issued
under the authority of 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970). Escalating civil penalties, and ultimately
a criminal penalty, may be imposed for violation of these regulations in proportion to the
willfulness and danger of the violation and whether or not a violation causes death. 29
U.S.C. § 666 (1970). Clarkson was cited for a "serious violation" in which case the Com-
mission could have assessed a penalty of up to $1,000. 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1970). Clarkson
was actually assessed only $500. [1974-1975] OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
19,071. A "serious violation" is
deemed to exist in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability
that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which
exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or pro-
cesses which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment
unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable
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tractors and operated by the subcontractor's employee, while
being operated in violation of this safety regulation, struck and
killed a workman.
Clarkson challenged the safety regulation on constitutional
grounds alleging that (1) the enforcement procedures were penal
in nature, rather than remedial or regulatory; (2) the enforcement
procedures violated the fifth amendment; (3) the regulatory
scheme denied Clarkson its right to a public trial in accordance
with the sixth amendment which requires, inter alia, the right to
a jury and the right to confront witnesses; and (4) if this regula-
tory scheme were truly civil, it denied Clarkson's seventh amend-
ment rights. The Tenth Circuit apparently viewed Clarkson's
arguments as unfounded and dismissed each of them rather sum-
marily.75
The primary question in this case, the consideration of which
divided the panel, with Judges Doyle and Hill forming the major-
ity and Judge Seth dissenting, was the appropriate construction
of section 1926.601(b)(4) of 29 C.F.R. According to this regula-
tion, "[n]o employer shall use any motor vehicle" in the pro-
scribed manner. More specifically, the court was concerned with
the meaning to be ascribed to the word "use." In other words, was
the statutory scheme intended to incorporate the common law
conception of an employer-employee relationship, as Judge Seth
contended, or the more flexible conception of vicarious liability
and responsibility, as urged by Judges Doyle and Hill. According
to Judge Seth's dissenting opinion, Clarkson would not be
deemed responsible for the operation of the truck in violation of
the regulation because the truck was owned by a subcontractor
and driven by an employee of the subcontractor. Therefore, the
subcontractor, not Clarkson, had a greater amount of direct con-
trol over the driver and, under the traditional common law view,
the driver was not to be considered an employee of the prime
contractor.7"
Although the majority opinion included a lengthy explana-
diligence, know of the presence of the violation.
29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1970).
7' 531 F.2d at 455-56. Accord, Stockwell Mfg. Co. v. Usery, 536 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir.
1976). See Note, Due Process and Employee Safety: Conflict in OSHA Enforcement
Procedures, 84 YALE L.J. 1380 (1975).
11 531 F.2d at 459.
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tion justifying the expanded definition of the employment rela-
tionship, the true basis of the decision seemed to be founded in
equity. In the words of Judge Doyle: "We are unable to overlook
the fact that the truck driver who ran over and killed the em-
ployee was serving the objects and purposes of Clarkson.""
To justify legally its decision, the court reasoned that admin-
istrative interpretations of the remedial scope of legislation are
entitled to great weight." In addition, both the Secretary of Labor
and the Commission had interpreted the regulation in the same
manner and, in a case where two specialized administrative bod-
ies are in agreement, a court should be hesitant to impose its own
inconsistent interpretation. Furthermore, in view of the legisla-
tion's remedial purpose of offering protection to workers from
industrial injury, a federal court should not feel bound, when
construing federal statutes, to adhere to the states' common law
conceptions which provide different bases of liability depending
upon how the relationship is defined.80
Against this background, the majority of the court was un-
willing to accept Clarkson's contention that the regulation in
issue should be construed in such a manner as to equate the term
"using" with "operating." Clarkson argued that it, as the prime
contractor, was not "operating" the subcontractor's truck and,
therefore, Clarkson was not the responsible employer within the
meaning of the regulation because it was not "using" the truck.
The majority concluded, however, that, in practical terms, Clark-
son was "using" the truck since the truck was, at the time of the
accident, being operated in furtherance of Clarkson's project. The
court, also, considered the prime contractor to be in a better
position to require the installation of the safety devices or, if
7 Id. at 457.
The majority cited for this proposition Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Supreme Court
subsequently narrowed the broadest reaches of the rule calling for such difference in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). In Gilbert the Court held that adminis-
trative regulations are less persuasive where they are not expressly authorized and where
they are issued many years after the legislation which they seek to implement and, espe-
cially, where they follow prior inconsistent administrative interpretations of the same
statute. 96 S. Ct. at 410-12.
n 531 F.2d at 457 (citing Budd Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
513 F.2d 201, 204-06 (3d Cir. 1975)).
1" 531 F.2d at 458.
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necessary, to provide the necessary lookouts for those trucks not
equipped with safety devices." This opinion was, in fact, con-
firmed by Clarkson's post-accident conduct which ordered all
trucks to be equipped with the warning devices.2
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Clarkson clearly indicates a
preference for that construction of a regulation which will place
the responsibility for dangerous conditions on the party most cap-
able of guaranteeing worker safety throughout the entire work-
site. For the same reason, i.e., protection of workers, the court
refused to relieve Clarkson of liability even though the accident
occurred on a road immediately adjacent to the worksite, as op-
posed to on the "off-highway jobsite," as required by the literal
terms of the regulation.83 The court refused to apply the regula-
tion literally where, as here, the employees were walking in the
actual construction site, or nearby road shoulder, and the truck
was being used to further the project at the worksite.5 4
In Stockwell Manufacturing Co. v. Usery, the petitioner
sought review of an order of the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission alleging that certain of its constitutional
rights had been violated by the issuance of an administrative
citation. The respondent moved to dismiss the proceeding for lack
of jurisdiction because Stockwell never sought review of the Com-
mission's decision and order.
Stockwell had been cited for nonserious occupational safety
violations. The company contested the citation," and a hearing
was held before an administrative law judge, who affirmed some
of the violations and vacated all proposed penalties. No member
I d.
" Id. at 454. The Fifth Circuit concluded, in Southeast Contractors, Inc. v. Dunlop,
512 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1975), that a contractor should not be held responsible for the
conduct of its subcontractor, and therefore, would have reached the same result as Judge
Seth. The Fifth Circuit's decision was per curiam, however, and simply adopted the
dissenting view expressed by Chairman Moran of the Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission in the administrative decision. Id. See [1973-1974] OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 17,787. Chairman Moran dissented from the Commis-
sion's decision for the same reason in the Clarkson case. [1974-1975] OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 19,071.
93 29 C.F.R. § 1926.601(a) (1976).
" 531 F.2d at 459.
- 536 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1976).
8- 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 666(c) (1970).
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of the Commission directed a review of the decision, and Stock-
well did not petition for review. The report of the administrative
law judge then became the final decision of the Commission. 7
The Tenth Circuit declined to consider the Commission's
allegation that Stockwell had failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies,8" finding a more serious jurisdictional defect in Stock-
well's failure to raise the constitutional issues before the adminis-
trative law judge or the Commission." Section 660(a) of 29 U.S.C.
provides that, on judicial review, the court of appeals shall not
consider any objection not urged before the Commission unless
"extraordinary circumstances" excuse the failure. Although
Stockwell contended that the constitutional violations before the
court for review were such "extraordinary circumstances," the
court held that since the alleged constitutional violations were
known to Stockwell at the time of the administrative hearing, its
failure to raise them at that time barred appellate review. 0 The
court went on to add that its review of the record revealed sub-
stantial evidence to sustain the findings of the Commission.
IV. BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT
In 1969, Congress enacted legislation which provides pay-
ments to coal miners who become totally disabled from pneumo-
coniosis, commonly known as black lung disease, and also to
surviving dependents of coal miners whose death is attributable
to the disease.9 The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
was initially responsible for promulgating regulations to aid in
the determination of whether a miner is totally disabled or
whether his death is due to the disease.2 Since proof of death or
total disability due to pneumoconiosis93 is complicated, Congress
established several presumptions to aid potential claimants in
.7 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970).
" See Fuchs, Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action, 51
IND. L.J. 817 (1976).
" 536 F.2d at 1309.
" Id. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.66 (1970) sets forth the duties of a hearing judge in the conduct
of a hearing. These duties include the duty "to adjudicate all issues."
" 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
12 Id. § 921. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare administers claims
under the Act filed prior to December 31, 1973.
" Pneumoconiosis is defined as a "chronic dust disease of the lung arising out of
employment in a coal mine." 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
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meeting their burden." The pertinent regulations reflect this pol-
icy and establish the same or similar presumptions."5
The applicability of two9" of the regulatory presumptions was
at issue in Felthager v. Weinberger.7 The claimant was the widow
of a coal miner who was killed in an accident while employed as
an assistant foreman at a coal mine, a position he had held for
fifteen years." At the time of his death, the miner was suffering
from a severe respiratory impairment." The claimant sought to
establish, by presumption, that the miner's death was due to
pneumoconiosis because he was totally disabled at the time of his
death from the respiratory ailment.'00 The Secretary determined
that the miner was not totally disabled from the ailment, there-
fore precluding the presumption that death was due to pneumo-
coniosis, and accordingly, denied benefits.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit examined the criteria of total
disability established both by statute and by regulation.'0 ' It
Id. § 921(c).
See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.414, .418, .454, .458, .490 (1976).
" 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.414(b), .454 (1976). The first of these two presumptions provides:
(1) Even though the existence of pneumoconiosis is not established . . .
[by medical evidence], if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a
totally disabling chronic respiratory or pulmonary ailment . . . , it may be
presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary . . . , that a miner is
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or that a miner was totally disabled
due to pneumoconiosis at the time of his death.
20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b). Section 410.454(b) raises the same presumption relative to the
finding that the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis. Both presumptions can be
rebutted by evidence showing that the miner is not, or did not, suffer from pneumocon-
iosis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.414(b)(2), .454(b)(2) (1976).
g7 529 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1976).
" While working at his job, the decedent became so exhausted from shortness of
breath that he had to sit down. He sat on the shuttle car tracks in the mine and was
subsequently run over by a shuttle car. He died a few hours later. The immediate cause
of death was listed as a compound fracture of the left leg, fractured pelvis, and pulmonary
edema. 529 F.2d at 132.
:' The Tenth Circuit stated: "There is no doubt the deceased miner suffered from
severe respiratory impairment. ... Id.
'® 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b). See note 96 supra.
"' The statute provides:
The term "total disability" has the meaning given it by regulations of
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, except that such regula-
tions shall provide that a miner shall be considered totally disabled when
pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requir-
ing the skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine
or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a
substantial period of time.
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noted that a person could be employed in a mine and yet be
totally disabled from a respiratory ailment if his employment was
characterized by sporadic work or poor performance." 2 The dece-
dent, however, was employed in a job he had held for over a
decade; although he worked with great difficulty, there was no
evidence of sporadic work or poor performance. 03 Also, his job was
not considered to be a "make-work" position offering only mar-
ginal earnings.0 4 Based on the facts in the record, the court felt
that "the fact he [the decedent] was doing his usual work in the
mines at the time of his death, if not conclusive, is at least sub-
stantial evidence in support of the Secretary's finding the de-
ceased was not totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.' 5 Ac-
cordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits.' 0
V. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
In Grider v. United States'°7 and Sturgell v. Weinberger,'5
claimants of disability benefits under the Social Security Act' 9
appealed the denial of benefits by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. The issue in both cases was whether the
claimants had established sufficient evidence that they were
"disabled" as defined by the Act. To be disabled, a claimant
30 U.S.C. § 902(f) (Supp. IV 1974). The regulations defining total disability from pneumo-
coniosis promulgated by the Secretary are nearly identical. 20 C.F.R. § 410.412(b) (1976).
"02 "Under the statutory definition, the mere fact of employment does not preclude a
finding of total disability." 529 F.2d at 133.
103 Sporadic work or poor performance were factors that had been instrumental in
findings of total disability. In Dellosa v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
the widow of a coal miner sought black lung disease benefits because her husband, who
was killed in an explosion in a mine, was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. Although
the decedent was working at the time of his death, his work had been sporadic for several
years. In addition, the decedent was not able "to adequately perform his mine work." Id.
at 1126. On these considerations, the district court remanded the case to the Secretary
for further findings in light of such factors. Id. The same questions were addressed in
Farmer v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1975), in which the court concluded that
the deceased miner's employment was not so poor or so sporadic that he was totally
disabled.
I0 A miner employed at his death may, also, be found to be totally disabled if the
miner is working at some make-work job not comparable to his usual coal mine work. See
Lawson v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Va. 1975); Rowe v. Weinberger, 400 F.
Supp. 981 (W.D. Va. 1975).
IN 529 F.2d at 135.
IN0 Id.
"" No. 75-1903 (10th Cir., June 2, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
00 No. 75-1933 (10th Cir., July 21, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
101 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1970 & Supp. 11 1972).
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must, inter alia, be unable to perform, and engage in, substantial
gainful activity as the result of a medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which is expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months."10 Although the claimants
in both Grider and Sturgell introduced evidence of their disabil-
ity, in both cases the Secretary concluded that the claimants'
burden had not been met."' The Tenth Circuit affirmed both
decisions after finding that the decisions of the Secretary were
supported by substantial evidence. '2
Similarly, a claimant's failure to meet his burden of proof
caused the denial of benefits in Anderson v. Weinberger."' To
qualify as disabled, a claimant must also show that his impair-
ment is of "such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy . . . ."I" Prior to his
disability, the claimant in Anderson had held numerous jobs,
although none on a routine basis."' In the administrative hearing,
the claimant asserted that he had unsuccessfully attempted to
return to his prior activities."' The administrative law judge con-
cluded, however, that the claimant could successfully engage in
work of the general type he had previously performed and that
the claimant was not disabled in terms of the Social Security
"' The Act defines the term disability as "inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. ... 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970).
' Both claimants introduced, as evidence, medical reports of disability and testified
personally as to their pain and disability. The claimant in Grider, however, failed to
establish her disability under the Act "by the required medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techinques .... " No. 75-1903 at 5. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit
found in SturgeU that "there was sufficient evidence in the record as a whole to conclude
that appellant failed to meet statutory prerequisites." No. 75-1933 at 4.
"1 According to the Social Security Act, the standard of review for agency decisions
requires that "[tihe findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive .... " 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970). This standard is inter-
preted in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
,, No. 76-1270 (10th Cir., Aug. 12, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1970) (emphasis added).
S The claimant lost sight in one eye during a scuffle following an assault. No. 76-
1270 at 2. Prior to the injury, he had been employed as a carpenter, truck driver, construc-
tion foreman, and common laborer. Id.
"' Id. at 3.
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Act." 7 Again, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision after find-
ing substantial evidence to support the determination of the ad-
ministrative law judge.1
8
As in Anderson, the severity of an impairment was also the
dispositive question in Kirk v. Weinberger."9 Unlike the situation
in Anderson, however, the claimant in Kirk was able to establish
that she was unable to perform the work in which she had been
engaged immediately prior to her disability.'20 She failed to prove,
however, that she was unable to work in occupations in which she
had previous experience and training.'2 ' Hence, she did not meet
the statutory burden placed on claimants and was, therefore, not
considered to be disabled. Again, the Tenth Circuit found that
the decision of the administrative law judge was supported by
substantial evidence and affirmed.'
22
The importance of Kirk is the burden of proof required by the
Tenth Circuit to establish statutory disability. The Tenth Circuit
stated:
[Ilf a claimant has any training or experience in a field of employ-
ment other than the one in which she was working prior to disability,
she must not only show her physical disability to continue at her
former occupation, but also that she is physically unable to perform
the other work for which she is qualified.' "
By this statement, the court has clarified the standard it will
require for proving disability in claims for disability benefits
under the Social Security Act.
124
17 The Tenth Circuit noted the administrative law judge's conclusion that "Anderson
was able to perform substantial gainful activity of a light or sedentary nature." Id. In fact,
the claimant conceded that he could probably work in a gas station or drive a pick up
truck. Id. at 4. Thus, the claimant did not establish that he was unable to return to the
general type of work he had been performing prior to his disability.
"' Id. at 3, 4. See note 112 supra.
"' No. 75-1652 (10th Cir., Apr. 27, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Id. at 2.
" Id. at 3.
"2 Id. at 6.
121 Id. at 4.
12 In several prior cases, the Tenth Circuit stated that a claimant need only establish
his inability to perform his usual vocation. See, e.g., Gardner v. Brian, 369 F.2d 443 (10th
Cir. 1966); Kirby v. Gardner, 369 F.2d 302 (10th Cir. 1966). Once this fact was established,
the burden shifted to the Secretary to show that suitable employment opportunities in
the immediate geographical area were available to the claimant. Failure by the Secretary
to meet this burden would thus entitle the claimant to disability benefits.
In Kirk, the court concluded that the claimant must not only prove his disability to
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VI. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Blackett,'2 " the
railway filed suit in district court to set aside an award of addi-
tional wages in favor of a railroad employee, pursuant to the
Railway Labor Act.'20 Although the district court denied the rail-
road's claim that the National Railroad Adjustment Board' 7
lacked jurisdiction to make the award, the court substantially
reduced the amount of the award.'28 As a result, the decision of
the district court was appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The dispositive issue on appeal was the reviewability of the
amount of the award made by the National Railroad Adjustment
Board.' 9 The Tenth Circuit considered two factors in deciding the
question. First, the court noted that although the Railway Labor
Act empowers district courts to set aside awards of the Board, the
reviewable aspects of board action are limited only to "lack of
jurisdiction, the Board's acting outside the law or the presence of
fraud or corruption on the Board.' 30 Second, the court inferred,
continue in his usual vocation but, also, must establish his disability to perform any other
kind of work for which he might be qualified. It is only after both facts are established
that the burden shifts to the Secretary either to identify suitable employment opportuni-
ties or, upon failure to identify such opportunities, to award the claimant disability bene-
fits. Thus, the holding in Kirk expands the claimant's burden.
"2 538 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
" Id. The Board is empowered to hear and decide numerous disputes, including
disputes between an employee and a carrier concerning rates of pay. Id. § 153(i).
'2 538 F.2d at 292.
" The Administrative Procedure Act provides that a person suffering legal wrong or
adversely affected by agency action is entitled to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
Such review is not available, however, where either a statute precludes judicial review or
the agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. Id. § 701(a). See Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
11 538 F.2d at 293. The Railway Labor Act limits the scope of review of judicial
decisions and, therefore, provides its own standard of review. See note 129 supra. The Act
states:
The [district] court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the order of the
division [of the National Railroad Adjustment Board], or to set it aside, in
whole or in part, or it may remand the proceeding to the division for such
further action as it may direct. On such review, the findings and order of the
division shall be conclusive on the parties, except that the order of the
division may be set aside . . .for failure of the division to comply with the
requirements of this chapter, for failure of the order to conform, or confine
itself, to matters within the scope of the division's jurisdiction, or for fraud
or corruption by a member of the division making the order.
45 U.S.C. § 153(g) (1970).
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from both the design and history of the Act, an intent to preclude
judicial review of matters relating to the amount of an award.' 3 '
Consistent with a prior decision on the same question,'32 the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the "district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to thus modify the award,"'1' and, therefore, reversed the
decision.'
34
VII. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
In Morton v. Dow,' 35 the Tenth Circuit upheld the authority
of the Federal Aviation Administrator under the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958131 to revoke, by emergency order, the petitioner's cer-
tificate of airworthiness. In so holding, the court relied upon (1)
the well-established principle that an agency may take emer-
gency action if the public health, safety, or welfare is endan-
gered' 37 and (2) the Administrator's statutory revocation author-
ity.' 38 The determination of the administrative law judge that the
evidence was sufficient to support revocation' 39 was upheld on the
basis of a finding that the petitioner's aircraft did not conform to
its type certificate.' 0
Although the petitioner also alleged that the statutory provi-
sions providing for review only after the revocation order had been
entered were violative of due process, the court summarily dis-
missed the allegation noting: "Congress recognized that the deci-
,' 538 F.2d at 293.
132 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 370 F.2d 833 (10th Cir.
1966).
" 538 F.2d at 294.
"3 Id. at 295.
"s 525 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1975).
'' 72 Stat. 731 (codified in scattered sections of 14, 15, 16, 31, 40, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
,31 See, e.g., Air East, Inc. v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 512 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975) (public safety outweighs licensee's right to pre-revocation
hearing).
lu 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) provides that the Administrator may
suspend or revoke, in whole or in part, any airworthiness certificate, if he determines that
safety in air commerce and the public interest so require.
'1' The administrative law judge held that the Board lacked the authority to investi-
gate and determine that an emergency existed and, thereby, limited his review to a
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence. 525 F.2d at 1306.
140 49 U.S.C. § 1423 (1970) requires that an aircraft be in safe operating condition and
conform to its type certificate. Morton had used an identification number and type certifi-
cate which he had obtained from parts salvaged from another aircraft. The plane which
he built from the salvaged parts was not the same type of aircraft as evidenced by the
type certificate. 525 F.2d at 1304-05.
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sion must be determined quickly by persons with expertise in
aviation matters."' 4 '
VIII. COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
In KAKE-TV & Radio, Inc. v. United States,' the petitioner
sought judicial review of the FCC's certification of a cable-TV
franchise. The court considered three basic administrative law
issues under the Communications Act of 1934:11 (1) the scope of
FCC certification proceedings; (2) the necessity of a formal hear-
ing; and (3) the scope of FCC discretion.
KAKE sought review of orders which were granted pursuant
to Aircapital Cablevision, Inc.'s application for certification to
commence cable-TV service in Wichita, Kansas. Aircapital had
been granted a cable-TV franchise by the city of Wichita, pur-
suant to a city ordinance, and the city had advised the FCC that
the franchise was valid." 4 When considering Aircapital's applica-
tion for certification, the FCC applied a presumption that the
franchise was also valid for FCC purposes. In contrast, KAKE
contended that the validity of the franchise should be decided
anew by the Commission, instead of resorting to this presump-
tion.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision not to
decide the validity question on the grounds that "[iut is not the
function of the F.C.C. to provide a forum to litigate such an issue,
and, furthermore, the Commission is not a tribunal equipped to
do so.' ' 5 The matter of a defect in the franchise, the court con-
cluded, "can be decided in the Kansas courts between the proper
parties.""'
" 525 F.2d at 1306. See also Air East, Inc. v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 512 F.2d
1227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
In addition, the petitioner challenged the admission of certain evidence by the admin-
istrative law judge. The court, however, merely relied upon the standard proposition that
"agencies are not bound by the strict rules of evidence governing jury trials" and upheld
the validity of the admissions. 525 F.2d at 1307.
142 537 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 808 (1977).
"1 48 Stat. 1064 (as amended and codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 46, 47
U.S.C.).
", Subsequently, the Kansas Supreme Court held that cities in Kansas did not have
authority to franchise cable-TV and voided the ordinance. But, the Kansas legislature
then passed an act validating cable-TV franchises theretofore granted. 537 F.2d at 1122.
Id. at 1123.
HA Id. KAKE had pressed legal proceedings in the state courts; however, during the
1977
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The court also affirmed the procedures of the FCC relative
to the certification order. Although the Commission had not held
hearings on Aircapital's application, it had received documents,
statements of position, objections, and other data both support-
ing and opposing the granting of the certificate of compliance.'47
Not only did the court find that there is no statutory requirement
for a formal hearing on cable-TV applications,'48 but it found that
the FCC's bases for decision were sufficiently disclosed to permit
effective court review.'
49
The question of whether Aircapital was in "substantial com-
pliance" with FCC regulations was considered to be solely within
the discretion of the Commission.'"
IX. NATURAL GAS ACT
In the three cases which confronted the Tenth Circuit con-
cerning the Natural Gas Act'"' and the Federal Power Commis-
sion, the court decided the issues by resorting to fundamental
administrative law principles concerning the scope of judicial re-
view.
In Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. FPC,151 the peti-
tioner, after filing for a rate increase, sought review of the Com-
pendency of the FCC proceedings, the Kansas Supreme Court decided that KAKE did
not have sufficient interest in the franchise to enable it to litigate the question and
dismissed the state action. In actuality, KAKE did not have a forum to contest the
validity of the franchise.
",7 Such procedures are in accordance with 47 C.F.R. § 76.27 (1976) which provides
procedures for submission of written objections and replies thereto in certification pro-
ceedings. 47 C.F.R. § 76.7 (1976) provides procedures for submission of written data on
petitions for special relief, but empowers the Commission to request oral argument or
hearing or decide on the pleadings.
1" 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970) provides for hearings only when a substantial and mate-
rial question of fact is presented or the Commission is unable to find that public conveni-
ence and necessity would be served by granting an application.
" 537 F.2d at 1122. The court detailed the order of the Commission in order to
demonstrate its conclusion that the Commission adequately disclosed the bases of its
decision, thereby meeting the requirements of Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962), and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
1"* 537 F.2d at 1122-23. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(b) (1976) provides the method for determin-
ing a franchise fee. KAKE alleged that the franchise fee to the City was too high to comply
with this regulation. Despite the fact that the court viewed this matter as being within
the discretion of the Commission, it noted that the record showed that the interested
parties planned a downward revision and later review. 537 F.2d at 1123.
Is' 15 U.S.C. § 717-717w (1970).
152 534 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1976).
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mission's determinations which changed several elements of the
ratemaking process. 5 3 The basic issue was whether the FPC's
decision to depart from the Mcf mile method, proposed by
Kansas-Nebraska, for allocating transmission costs had a ra-
tional basis, particularly since there had been no change in peti-
tioner's circumstances. Kansas-Nebraska also questioned the va-
lidity of the FPC's closing the case on the adjustment of zone
boundaries for cost allocation, in view of the Commission's state-
ment that further hearings were necessary.
54
When considering the argument that the FPC's decision
lacked a rational basis, the Tenth Circuit applied both SEC v.
Chenery Corp. 'S55 standard of review of agency action and the
presumption of agency correctness,5 M and quickly disposed of the
issue. In addition, the court concluded that "[t]he theories used
by the FPC in arriving at the end result are peculiarly within its
discretion"'57 and a departure from the Mcf method was within
the agency's regulatory authority.' Because the Commission had
determined that "'Kansas-Nebraska's method of applying mile-
ages to its allocation of costs results in unreasonable differences
in rates charged to customers' "' the FPC's actions were, indeed,
justified by a change of conditions.
' The FPC issued two opinions "which changed cost allocations in the two zones;
used a different formula for allocating transmission costs; changed the classification of
gathering costs; changed rate design, and excluded some of the capitalization for rate of
return computations." Id. at 229.
"I, The FPC determined that " 'based on the data contained in the record, it would
be most difficult to draw a zone line that would be meaningful and reasonable in this
case.' " 534 F.2d at 230. However, the idea of completing the record was rejected, because
it would have had the effect of prolonging the case for some four years.
'n 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Chenery established the principle that:
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety
of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds
are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administra-
tive action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper
basis.
Id. at 196. See also Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263 (1960).
"' In Amoco Prod. Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1973), the court held that
"[tihe FPC's interpretation is entitled to great weight, since a presumption of validity
attaches to a Commission's exercise of its expertise." Id. at 921.
1*, 534 F.2d at 230.
Im Id. See also Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945), which held
that the Commission had wide latitude in determining allocation formulas.
"1 534 F.2d at 231. Kansas-Nebraska's rate structure formula had been considered
by the Commission in 1961.
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Although the FPC's orders resulted in a refund by petitioner,
the court upheld the orders by reasoning that:
It is apparent that the Commission cannot dispose of all the prob-
lems before it in any one case. As before any administrative body
many issues are decided on a case by case basis, on how the issue
arises, and how the record is developed . . . . [Tibere comes a
point where the record must be closed and the case be decided.8 0
Kansas-Nebraska also alleged that the FPC action had re-
sulted in undercollection in one zone. Although noting that
"[u]nfortunately this is not an unusual happening," the court
held that "the company took the risk that an undercollection as
to one segment might occur."' 6
The Tenth Circuit, in Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC,12 clearly ex-
pressed its view that agency decisions on matters of law are sub-
ject to judicial review. In Skelly, Skelly and Lone Star Gas had
entered into a twenty-year contract, which, by amendment, pro-
vided that if the gas pressure from the properties involved should
drop below the point where delivery would be impossible, the
agreement would terminate. Subsequently, after a continuing
pressure drop in the wells, the parties agreed that the contract
had expired,6 3 and entered into a second contract. When Skelly's
application for a rate increase under the second contract was
10 Id. The FPC indicated that the staff method of allocation would be '"adopted
subject to a complete record being developed' in another case." Id. The court interpreted
this statement to mean that the staff's formula would not necessarily be applicable in
future cases.
I Id. at 232. The procedure set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970) provides that when
proposed rate changes go into effect, at the expiration of the suspension period, "the
Commission may, by order, require the natural-gas company ... to refund any amounts
ordered by the Commission." Thus, the statute does not provide for any resulting under-
collection. See also FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145, 153 (1962),
wherein the Supreme Court recognized that such an adjustment policy was consistent
with the policy of the Natural Gas Act.
The court found no merit in the petitioner's objection to the FPC determination that
field gathering costs should be treated, for ratemaking, as 100% commodity costs, rather
than as "demand" and "commodity costs." Similarly, the court found no basis for an
objection to the adjustment of Kansas-Nebraska's rate of return on capitalization, inas-
much as "[tJhis is at most a difference in policy or theory, and the FPC determination
was well within its discretion." 534 F.2d at 232 (citing Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 424
F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1969)).
,62 532 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1976).
10 Id. at 178. After the expiration of the base contract, Lone Star agreed to install
the compression equipment itself and to buy the gas under a new arrangement based upon
compression by the purchaser. Id. at 179.
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denied by the Commission on the basis that it was not a
"replacement contract" because the original contract did not
expire "by its own terms,"" 4 Skelly sought judicial review of this
denial.
In the court's opinion, the question of whether the original
contract expired by its own terms, was governed by "ordinary
contract law, a Williston-Corbin problem," and not subject to the
Natural Gas Act. 65 Moreover, the court found that the record
disclosed no evidence or claim that the parties themselves
brought the pressure clause into operation, but rather the evi-
dence revealed that the clause became operative through objec-
tive, measurable events, which were not within the parties' con-
trol. '6 Since the question was one of law and the determination
of the Commission was, therefore, not entitled to judicial defer-
ence, the court was able to find that the pressure clause was a
"typical condition under the Corbin definition" and therefore did
expire by its own terms.6 7
In McCulloch Interstate Gas Corp. v. FPC,165 McCulloch
sought judicial review of two FPC orders which allegedly would
have permitted "the sale and delivery of gas by Phillips
[Petroleum Company] to Panhandle [Eastern Pipe Line Com-
pany] 'in direct competition with other volumes of natural gas
produced and sold to McCulloch Interstate by other producers of
"I Id. at 178. The replacement contract policy was established in several FPC opin-
ions: Opinion No. 639, 48 F.P.C. 1299 (1972); Opinion No. 699, 51 F.P.C. 2212 (1974); and
Opinion No. 699-H, 52 F.P.C. 1604 (1974). This policy required that "where a new contract
is executed with respect to an existing interstate sales [sic] where the previous sales
contract has expired by its own terms . . . such gas will be eligible for the R-389-B [base
national] rate." 51 F.P.C. at 2275.
"1 532 F.2d at 179. The court cited several cases supportive of the proposition that
the Natural Gas Act does not alter ordinary contractual relationships between parties.
See, e.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956). In
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 282 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1960), the court had previously
indicated that a decision by the FPC is not entitled to judicial deference when such a
decision is based upon contract law rather than the Commission's special expertise.
"I Because the court found that Skelly and Lone Star had not subjectively agreed to
terminate the contract, the court was able to distinguish Mobile Oil Corp., 49 F.P.C. 239
(1973), wherein the parties had agreed to add additional acreage and the base contract
had no provision for termination.
"1 532 F.2d at 180. The court carefully limited its decision to the question of termina-
tion, refusing to decide how that determination might relate to other issues raised or other
factors.
1" 536 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1976).
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natural gas in the same fields,' ""9 resulting in McCulloch buffer-
ing "' a diminution in its required supplies of natural gas.' "I"7
McCulloch intervened in the proceedings before the FPC
when Phillips sought the FPC's authorization to sell uncommit-
ted gas to Panhandle at the mill compressor station owned by
Panhandle and operated by Phillips. To accomplish the sale,
Phillips proposed to construct approximately thirty-five miles of
pipeline to connect Phillips' wells to the mill station.
The FPC ruled that the proposed pipeline was not within its
jurisdiction because, it concluded, the facilities were gathering
facilities of an independent producer which are not subject to the
requirements of the Natural Gas Act. The FPC, therefore, did not
consider the merits of Phillips' application. When McCulloch's
petition for rehearing was denied, it did not seek judicial review
of the decision.'
7'
In the subsequent FPC hearing, wherein Phillips was granted
a temporary certificate for the sale of gas, the jurisdictional issue
was not considered, inasmuch as the FPC felt that McCulloch's
failure to seek judicial review "effectively forecloses further con-
sideration thereof.' Thereafter, without a hearing, the FPC en-
tered an order granting Phillips a permanent certificate. Again,
when McCulloch's application for rehearing was denied, judicial
review was not sought. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reasoned
that "[t]he controlling issue is whether FPC should have exer-
cised jurisdiction over the pipelines . . . .It declined to do so
because they were exempt gathering facilities. Agency decisions
on jurisdiction are subject to court review."'' 3
In spite of the court's recognition of the reviewability of juris-
dictional issues, it found that the procedures for judicial review
prescribed explicitly in the Natural Gas Act were exclusive.
7
Because "[tihe mode of challenging an agency's jurisdictional
"' Id. at 911.
170 Id.
'"' 15 U.S.C. § 717r (1970) sets forth the procedures for judicial review of FPC deter-
minations.
"1 536 F.2d at 912.
'1 Id. at 912-13 (citing Utah Copper Co. v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 129 F.2d 358
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 687 (1942)).
"' 536 F.2d at 913.
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decision is by direct attack"'' 5 and "[a] party may not collater-
ally attack the validity of a prior agency order in a subsequent
proceeding,"'' 6 McCulloch was estopped from seeking judicial
review of the jurisdictional issue by his failure to seek court re-
view after the denial of his petition for rehearing. The court also
found that McCulloch's failure to seek court review was disposi-
tive of McCulloch's contention that it was under no compulsion
to seek review until a final disposition was made on Phillips'
certification.' 7 Additionally, the court upheld the informal pro-
ceedings in which the FPC granted Phillips a permanent certifi-
cate on the grounds that the pertinent facts were not contested
and "[nlo evidentiary hearing is required when the proceeding
involves only a question of law."' 7
X. MINERAL LEASING AcT
The petitioners in Hunter v. Morton,"' appealed from deci-
sions and rulings of the Department of Interior which denied
them coal prospecting permits in Utah. The petitioners had pro-
perly filed three applications for such permits, pursuant to the
Mineral Leasing Act'80 and the regulations promulgated thereun-
der. 18 The manager for the Utah State Land Office of the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) rejected one application in its en-
tirety. In a second decision, the manager rejected the other appli-
cations as to part of the acreage and conditioned the issuance of
any permits as to the remaining acreage on the applicants' meet-
ing certain conditions.8 2
The applicants did not attempt to meet the conditions im-
173 Id.
- Id. The principle that a party may not collaterally attack the validity of a prior
agency order in a subsequent proceeding has been often applied to administrative cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Callanan Road
Improvement Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 507 (1953); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific
Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
These cases also justify the court's contention that "[a]n agency's determination of facts
underlying its conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking must be given effect in subsequent
litigation." 536 F.2d at 913.
1 536 F.2d at 913.
'7 Id. See also Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
," 529 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1976).
30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970).
"' 43 C.F.R. §§ 3510, 3511 (1976).
529 F.2d at 647.
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posed on that acreage which was not rejected and did not appeal
the manager's decision not to issue permits on such acreage. An
appeal was perfected, however, from the decisions of the manager
insofar as those decisions rejected their applications."s: Before
final action in the appellate process was taken, the Secretary of
the Interior promulgated Order Number 2952 which suspended
the issuance of all such coal prospecting permits until further
notice and rejected all pending applications. 4 Accordingly, the
appeals were rejected and the permit applications were denied."5
The petitioners raised three important questions in an ap-
peal to the Tenth Circuit after the district court rejected petition-
ers' claims to any coal permits.' 6 First, petitioners argued that
they had not received proper notice of "the choices presented in
the administrative appeals when part of the application was re-
jected and part was not."'87 Although the decision stated that the
applicants had a right to appeal such a determination and identi-
fied the procedure to follow,'" the court noted that the decision
left "much to be desired in the way of clarity in the notice of right
to appeal" that portion of the decision conditioning the issuance
of a permit.'8' The court dismissed the argument, however, be-
cause the decision was "sufficient to advise the applicant to take
some action as to the acreage not rejected if he wants to move
toward a perfected application.""'
Secondly, the petitioners argued that they had acquired an
interest or a right by their applications to the extent they were
not rejected, and that rejection of their pending applications pur-
suant to the Secretary's order was erroneous."' Citing ample pre-
"3 Id. at 647-48.
' 38 Fed. Reg. 4,682 (1973).
529 F.2d at 647.
The applicants brought an action in district court seeking a "decree that petition-
ers owned the permits, for mandamus to direct their formal issuance, and to enjoin the
Secretary from advancing claims adverse to applicants' 'ownership."' Id.
", Id. at 648.
t The decisions contained the following clause:
Thirty days from receipt of this decision are allowed in which to meet the
requirements above indicated or appeal to the Director, Bureau of Land
Management. If no action is taken, the case will be closed on the records of
this office, as to the available lands, without further notice.
Id. at 647.





cedent, the court dismissed this argument on the basis that the
applicants acquired no property rights by simply filing their
offer. " Accordingly, the court found that there had been no
wrongful rejection of the applications pursuant to the Order.
In their third argument, petitioners claimed that the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act9 3 was not followed in the issuance and
application of Order 2952."1 The court rejected this argument and
held that such action was an exercise of discretion (by the Secre-
tary of Interior) over public land administration and was there-
fore exempted from the standard rulemaking procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 95
XI. ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN ESTATES
The same factual setting presented the Tenth Circuit with
two separate questions during the last term.'" Two attorneys had
presented a claim of $8,250 against the estate of an Otoe Indian
for legal services rendered to the decedent during his life.'97 The
"I The provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act give the Secretary discretion to issue
coal prospecting permits: "Where prospecting or exploratory work is necessary to deter-
mine the existence or workability of coal deposits in any unclaimed, undeveloped area,
the Secretary of Interior may issue . . . prospecting permits. ... 30 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(1970). The Tenth Circuit concluded that, because the Secretary has discretion to issue
prospecting permits after application, such applications do not create a property right.
This conclusion is consistent with decisions establishing that an application for an oil and
gas lease does not create a vested property right if the issuance of such a lease is also
discretionary with the Secretary. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Hannifin
v. Morton, 444 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1971); Thor-Westcliffe Dev., Inc. v. Udall, 314 F.2d
257 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 951 (1963). See also Woods Petroleum Corp., GFS
(Min) 73 (1973); E.L. Lockhardt, GFS (Min) 74 (1973).
5 U.S.C. § 551 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
529 F.2d at 647.
"9 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). This section of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act sets forth procedures to be followed by an agency when promulgating rules and
regulations. The provisions of the section, however, do not apply to the extent that rule-
making is "a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." Id. § 553(a)(2). The Tenth Circuit, in Morton, found
that the issuance of Order No. 2952 constituted an exercise of discretion by the Secretary
in administering federal property and "comes well within the exceptions to the application
of the Administrative Procedure Act in that it is a general application of policy and
concerns federal property." 529 F.2d at 649.
it Hill v. Morton, 525 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Hill I]; Hill v.
Morton, No. 76-1164 (10th Cir., Aug. 30, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication) [hereinafter
cited as Hill II].
" Determination of Heirs and Approval of Wills, Except as to Members of the Five
Civilized Tribes and Osage Indians, 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.200-4.297 (1976).
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Secretary of the Interior determined the reasonable value of the
services to be $1,500 and awarded the claimants that amount., "
The attorneys sought judicial review of the Secretary's deter-
mination in the District Court for the Western District of Okla-
homa. In a two sentence judgment, the district court concluded
that the Secretary's determination was arbitrary and capricious
and ordered the Secretary to pay the full amount of the claim.'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment and re-
manded the matter for further proceedings9" because the district
court had not met its "affirmative duty upon. . . reviewing ad-
ministrative action to engage in substantial inquiry of the rele-
vant facts as developed in the administrative record and then to
define, specifically, those facts which it deems supportive of the
agency decision if that is the court's resolution of the matter." 0'
Since the district court had merely stated that the action was
arbitrary and capricious, without further explanation, the Tenth
Circuit did not have an adequate basis for appellate review.10
On remand, the district court, again, held the Secretary's
determination to be arbitrary and capricious. 03 The court rea-
soned that the evidence presented by the attorneys as to the time
spent in representing the decedent, and the rate of compensation
therefor, was binding on the Secretary in the determination of
fees.204 When this decision was appealed, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that the Secretary correctly viewed the rate of compensa-
", Hill II, No. 76-1164 at 2.
" Hill 1, 525 F.2d at 327.
Id. at 328.
I0 d.
In reaching this decision, the court relied on both Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d
1389 (10th Cir. 1974), and Heber Valley Milk Co. v. Butz, 503 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1974). In
essence, Hill I somewhat expanded the holding of these cases. Both Nickol and Heber
Valley involved a district court's granting of summary judgment. The court, in each case,
concluded that summary judgment is inappropriate where the question for review is
whether an administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Comment,
The Propriety of Summary Judgment in Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 52
DEN. L.J. 46 (1975). Even though Hill I differed procedurally from Nickol and Heber
Valley since the district court did not consider summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit felt
that the "minor dissimilarity is without real significance in this case in view of the
proceedings in the district court which were, for all practical purposes, summary in na-
ture." 525 F.2d at 328. Hill 's extension of the Nickol rule appears to be limited in scope,
however, since it is dependent upon the nature of the review proceedings in the trial court.
I Hill II, No. 76-1164 at 2.
m Id. at 5.
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tion and hours spent in representation as only two of many factors
to be considered in determining the reasonable value of attorneys'
services. 0 5 After reviewing all of the relevant factors, the court
concluded that the Secretary's allowance of only $1,500 for serv-
ices rendered did not constitute an arbitrary disregard of the
evidence so as to render the action capricious. 0 Accordingly, the
court upheld the Secretary's determination.
Carleton L. Ekberg
Kristine A. Hoeltgen
2 Id. Among other factors considered by the court were the "novelty and difficulty
of the issues involved, the amount involved and the results obtained, and the experience,
reputation, and skill of the lawyers performing the services." Id.
'm Id. at 9. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that the reviewing court shall
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . .
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law
. .. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).

